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statute. The court acknowledged that the GMA requires a landowner's
consent before transporting water off the land, and held that the
legislature did not believe a right to future prospective groundwater use
existed because otherwise it would not require consent if it believed
such rights existed and were transferrable. Thus, the court held that
landowners do not have a real property interest in potential future
groundwater use which they can sever from the overlying land.
The Supreme Court of Arizona vacated and remanded the case to the
Arizona Court of Appeals for hearing on other arguments.
Andrew Reitman
COLORADO
Vance v. Wolfe, 205 P.3d 1165 (Colo. 2009) (holding that coal-bed
methane gas wells' use of ground water constitutes a "beneficial use,"
giving rise to appropriative water rights; these rights are subject, under
statute, to permits issued by the State Engineer and to the State
Engineer's administration of augmentation plans approved by water
courts).
William S. Vance, Jr., Elizabeth S. Vance, James Fitzgerald, and Mary
Theresa Fitzgerald (the "Ranchers") possess water rights in sources
tributary to the Piedra and Pine Rivers. The Ranchers claimed that coalbed methane ("CBM") production diverted ground water that would
have otherwise discharged into the Piedra and Pine. CBM wells tap into
deep coalbed formations that contain methane gas trapped in
hydrostasis. By removing the water that surrounds the formations, CBM
producers release the gas for withdrawal. CBM producers bring the
water to the surface, store it briefly, and then re-inject it below the
aquifers that formerly held the gas.
The Ranchers brought a motion for declaratory judgment in the
Water Division 7 District Court (the "water court"), naming the Colorado
State Engineer and the Division Engineer of Water Division 7 ("the
Engineers") as defendants. The Ranchers sought a declaration that,
under statutory law, CBM production is a "beneficial use" of water that
places legal obligations on the Engineers to protect senior vested water
rights. The water court issued a summary judgment in the Ranchers'
favor and the Engineers appealed directly to the Colorado Supreme
Court. In this case of first impression, the court addressed whether CBM
production involves the beneficial use of water, whether the court must
defer to the Engineers' interpretation of beneficial use, and whether
CBM production is exclusively within the province of the Colorado Oil
and Gas Conservation Commission ("COGCC").
Two state statutes aided the court in its determination of the
Engineers' obligations: the Colorado Ground Water Management Act
("GWM Act") and the Water Right Determination and Administration
Act of 1969 ("1969 Act"). The GWM Act states that people cannot build
new "wells" in designated areas without a permit. The 1969 Act defines
a well, generally, as a structure that obtains an aquifer's water for
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beneficial use. In addition to arguing that CBM wells meet the statutory
definition of a well, the Ranchers claimed that CBM wells "appropriate"
water-apply it to a beneficial use-at the expense of the Ranchers'
senior water rights. Colorado doctrine protects water rights in order of
appropriation. Accordingly, the 1969 Act can require the more recent
appropriator to submit an "augmentation plan" detailing how he or she
will restore depleted water to the senior appropriator. Both the GWM
Act and the 1969 Act obligate the Engineers to issue well permits and
administer augmentation plans decreed by the water court.
The GWM Act and the 1969 Act share the premise that people
should put water to beneficial use. The court adopted the definition
contained in the 1969 Act-"the use of that amount of water that is
reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to
accomplish the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully made."
The court found that CBM production constitutes beneficial use because
it "uses" water by extracting it from the ground to "accomplish" the
"purpose" of releasing methane gas.
The court also rejected the Engineers' argument that water
withdrawn during CBM production has no beneficial use because it is an
unwanted byproduct that producers extract coincidentally with gas.
The court's previous holdings establish that, when an activity inevitably
results in the diversion of ground water, this inevitability obviates the
purpose requirement of beneficial use. In this case, the extraction of
water is not only an inevitable result of CBM production, it is integral to
that production. The court determined that it was irrelevant that the
water might become a nuisance after its beneficial use, because neither
statute nor case law requires the satisfaction of a temporal element for
beneficial use.
The court also rejected the Engineers' claim that the GWM Act
exempts CBM withdrawal water because it is nontributary. Colorado
courts presume that ground water is tributary until a party proves
otherwise. The Engineers did not attempt such proof. Therefore, the
court affirmed the water court's determination that this case involves
tributary water.
After considering the Engineers' arguments, the court concluded
that CBM wells are wells under the GWM Act, and therefore require well
permits issued by the Engineers. Additionally, the court determined
that the 1969 Act requires the Engineers to administer augmentation
plans approved by the water court. The court found that this regulatory
scheme, dependent upon both the State Engineer and the water court,
provides sufficient protection to senior water rights holders and
addresses the Ranchers' injury. A State Engineer's permitting involves
determining the existence of unappropriated water and establishing
whether a party can make an appropriation without injury. By statute
and according to precedent, water courts-not the Engineers-establish
the presence or absence of a water right.
On the issue of deference to the Engineers, the court concluded that
it is not bound to defer to the Engineers' definition of beneficial use.
This is particularly true when, as here, the court found that the
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definition was contrary to that provided in statutory law and case law.
Finally, the court found that COGCC regulation of gas wells does not
release the Engineers from the duty to permit and administer
augmentation plans for CBM wells. The court did not create an
exemption from the GWM and 1969 Acts for gas production.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's holding and
remanded the case for further proceedings.
Sarah Felsen
IDAHO
Mesenbrink v. Hosterman, 210 P.3d 516 (Idaho 2009) (holding that
riparian owners of land abutting non-navigable lakes take title to land
between the ends of meander line and the center of lake).
Herman Lake ("Lake") is a 30-acre, non-navigable lake surrounded
by privately owned property. The Mesenbrinks, private landowners,
brought suit against the Idaho Department of Lands ("Department") and
neighboring landowners ("neighbors"), the Hostermans and the
Hubbards, to determine ownership of the land between their property
and the Lake's waterline. The Mesenbrinks contended that their lot
abutted a portion of the Lake's ordinary high water mark in 1890, when
Idaho achieved statehood. They claimed that the water level had since
lowered, and that they owned the land between their property line and
the existing high water mark.
Subsequently, the Idaho State Board of Land Commissioners
determined that the Lake was non-navigable at Idaho's statehood; thus,
the state had no title to the lakebed. The Department then filed an
answer to the Mesenbrinks' suit, disclaiming any interest in the Lake
because the Lake was non-navigable at Idaho's statehood. As a result,
the Mesenbrinks and the Department stipulated to dismissal with
prejudice because the Department had disclaimed any interest in the
lakebed. The District Court for the First Judicial District ("district
court") dismissed the claim against the Department with prejudice. The
district court tried the remainder of the case, determining the ordinary
high water mark's location at the time of Idaho's statehood. The parties
stipulated that the district court could enter judgment granting the
Mesenbrinks property down to the Lake's current ordinary high water
mark. The district court entered judgment pursuant to the stipulation
and the neighbors appealed to the Supreme Court of Idaho.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Idaho considered whether there
was substantial and competent evidence supporting the district court's
finding as to the Lake's ordinary high water mark at Idaho's statehood.
After explaining that Idaho's ownership of land underlying navigable
waters originated with the grant of statehood, the court noted that the
trial court misused case law applicable to navigable, rather than nonnavigable waters. Owners of land abutting non-navigable waters have
different rights the trial court did not consider.
Although Idaho received title to land under navigable waters, the

